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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is Worker's Compensation case appealed from the Industrial 
Commission ("the Commission"), involving two injuries, four days apart, to Betty Christensen, 
which occ1med on December 5 and December 9, respectively, 2002. Hearing was held before the 
Industrial Commission hearing officer on November 29, 2006. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were entered by the Commission on November 20, 2007. Thereafter, an Order on 
Reconsideration was entered by the Commission on March 30, 2008. 
11. Course of the Proceedings. The Commission below approved the recommended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Referee Rinda Just that Claimant had not met her burden of 
establishing that her accepted injuries of 2005, combined with her previous impairments and 
disability to render her totally and permanently disabled. 
111. Statement of the Facts. At the time of the hearing, Betty Christensen was a 47 year old 
single mom with grown children. She had graduated from high school and had worked in various 
entry level jobs including electronic assembly and daycare, before completing post secondary 
schooling to become a medical assistant and medical secretary, which field she worked in steadily 
for approximately 12 years until she suffered a significant injury to her right leg in 1992. Tr. p. 96 -
Tr. p. 99, Claimant's Exhibit 8. 
The 1992 injury was also marked by complications owing to a disease which coincidently 
was diagnosed while Betty was healing from this right lower leg injury. This disease was known as 
Charcot Marie Tooth Disease, which is characterized as a severe degenerative neurological illness 
affecting the distal lower extremities. She underwent a triple fusion of her right a11kle in Seattle, 
Washington due to the injury and the effects of the disease. Tr. p. 73, !. 20 - p. 34 !. 8. 
The 1992 injmywas characterized by her friend and physician, as one that clearly constituted 
a hindrance or obstacle to resumption of employment. Tr. p. 39, l. 23 -p. 40, /. 2. As a consequence 
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of the 1992 injury and its sequalae, Betty withdrew from full-time work and applied for Social 
Security. Tr. p. l 05, l. 25 - p. l 06, l. 1. 
The injuries of record that have been accepted by the Defendant/Employer, the State 
Insurance Fund, took place, as previously indicated, four days apart, the first on December 5, 2002 
and the second on December 9, 2002. Both injuries are marked by one unifying theme. Betty 
Christensen was attempting to avoid injury to patients that she was caring for in her job with S.L. 
Start, where she was working as a community support specialist. In the first, she was attempting to 
assist a patient being lifted out of a bus who was paralyzed from the waist down. During the 
transfer, she injured her back and right leg and lower extremity when the weight from the gait belt 
pulled her in this awkward position toward the patient. Tr. p. I I 5, l. l - p. I I 7, l-5. Four days later, 
while assisting another client, who was about to faint, she injured herself in trying to prevent injury 
to this client, who had become light headed while entering the hospital. She immediately 
experienced severe pain in the right shoulder, the neck, lower back, across both hips, and down the 
right leg. Tr. p. 118, l. IO - p. 119, I. I 8. 
The treatment for these two injuries consisted of surgery to her right great toe and shoulder 
surgery. She had also been worked up by a neurosurgeon for complaints in her low back, but was 
felt by her attending physician to not be a surgical candidate. Ultimately, her attending physician, 
Dr. Carraher, issued a combined rating of 18%, giving various values for the surgically fused foot, 
the shoulder difficulty and her low back impairment. Plaintiff's Exhibit I, p. 10-11, Tr. p. 41, l. 
10- p. 43, l. 19. 
Her vocational histo1y, after her hiatus from work and prior to the 2002 injuries, consisted 
of approximately 5 years of steady, albeit part time employment in the medical community. Her 
resume is documented by exhibit (Claimant's Exhibit 8), which lists the several jobs that she held 
on a part time basis between July of 1997 through February of 2002. These jobs include medical 
assistant, office nurse, patient care, assisting with minor procedures, and a variety of medically 
related jobs in the Coeur d'Alene medical community. Id. Not one of these jobs was full time and, 
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as indicated previously, Betty had been receiving Social Secu1ity. Under applicable Social Security 
rules and regulations, Betty was allowed to earn as much as $700 per month in part time work and 
still obtain her Social Security. 20 CFR §404.1744(b)(Il)(ii)(B). Betty Christensen has not returned 
to any employment, part time or full time, since the 2002 injuries. 
Vocational experts testified on both sides of this case, as well as a Physical Therapist who 
performed a physical capacities exam (P.C.E.). Mark Bengtson, a physical therapist with Summit 
Rehabilitation Associates, testified that Claimant could not sustain even a 4 hour sedentary workday 
on a sustained basis. Deposition Transcript, Mark Bengtson, p. 47, Ins. 11-14. Claimant's 
vocational expert, Tom Moreland, opined that, based upon his review of the medical evidence, 
including Mr. Bengtson's testimony, that Betty Christensen had lost the residual capacity to even 
engage in the work she had enjoyed pre-accident; to wit part time employment. The defense made 
the argument that Betty Christensen was already totally disabled based upon the ravages of her 1992 
injury and the impact of the Charcot Marie Tooth Disease, notwithstanding the fact that Betty was 
actively involved in the workforce for 5 years as a valuable member of the medical community 
before being injured at S.L. Start. 
From this evidence, the hearing officer concluded, and the Commission agreed, that Betty 
Christensen was already totally disabled before her 2002 injury and was, thus, not entitled to 
disability benefits. As an epilogue to the hearing, the Undersigned filed a Motion to Reconsider 
asking that the Commission award impairment based upon the essentially undisputed evidence of 
her treating physician. The Referee, again, concurred by the Commission, determined that the 
opinions of the consultants retained by the Defendant were more precisive and, accordingly, no 
impairment was awardable. R. pp. 67 - 70. 
IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Whether the Commission erred by not following the teachings of Page vs. McCain 
Foods, Inc., docket no. 33158, requiring a two-tiered analysis of disability. 
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2. Whether application of the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine. in this case was properly 
invoked? 
3. Whether the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine should be overruled by this Court? 
V. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Introduction. 
The central issue in this case revolves around whether or not a person is receiving Social 
Security disability benefits and working part-time can become eligible for total and permanent 
disability benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act. The standard to be utilized by this Court 
regarding evidentiary issues is very familiar. This Court will not reweigh the evidence or the 
credibility thereofrelied upon by the Commission and it will not disturb any findings regarding the 
weight and credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. Hutton vs. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 73, 
149 P.3d. 848 (2006). This Court, however, exercises free review over legal issues. Id. 
In this case the Claimant contended she was totally disabled on the basis of the odd lot 
doctrine. It is thus governed by the provisions of Idaho Code §72-332(1), which provides: 
Payment for second injuries from industrial special indemnity account. - (1) If 
an employee who has a pennanent physical impainnent from any cause or origin, 
incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and 
in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the 
pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease or by 
reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total 
and pen11anent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of 
compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational 
disease, including scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured 
employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the 
industrial special indemnity account. 
Idaho Code §72-332(1). 
This Court has held that the Claimant seeking to obtain contribution from the ISIP must 
provide: ( 1) that there was a pre-existing impairment, (2) that the impairment was manifest; (3) that 
the impairment was a subject hindrance; and ( 4) that the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent 
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injury in some way combine to result in total and permanent disability. Dumaw vs. JL. Norton 
Logging, 118 ldaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990). 
2. The Commission erred by not making separate findings of disability and then 
allocating those elements of disability to pre-existing and post accident conditions. 
Less than two months following the decision of the Referee in this case, the Supreme Court 
announced a decision long awaited by Worker's Compensation practitioners. Page vs. McCain 
Foods, Inc. (January 2008, Supreme Court docket no. 33158). This case stands for the proposition 
that in any worker's compensation case where there is the issue of pennanent disability that may be 
impacted in part upon a prior impainnent, as well as the impairn1ent reflective of the injury under 
examination, the Commission must engage in a two-tiered analysis. First, the Commission must 
make a separate finding as to the degree of pennanent disability from all sources, then the 
Commission must apportion that disability between pre-existing injuries and the current injury. Id. 
It is evident in this case that the hearing officer did not engage in such an analysis. Indeed, the 
hearing officer seemed to have been seemed to have been fixated upon how many hours and how 
many dollars the Claimant earned during the five years period of time prior to the accident(s) rather 
than analyzing whether or not this was meaningful employment. A proper analysis of the evidence 
would have involved a finding of the level of disability of Claimant and a con-esponding assessment 
of physical restrictions, limitations and abilities contrasted between her pre-2002 condition and her 
condition following the accident(s). For exan1ple, how long could she walk, sit, stand, etc. before 
and after the 2002 injury? How much could she lift and/or carry? Then, an analysis as to how those 
impairments affected Claimant to earn a competitive wage should have been done .. 
It is evident on this record that the Claimant was unable to work in a full time capacity and 
could only work in a part time capacity doing sedentary work. That to some would be considered 
a substantial disability. Indeed, it is conceded by the Undersigned that such would be an accurate 
portrayal of the overall employability of Betty Christensen as of December of 2002. 
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Having said that, she was, in fact, engaged in work in a competitive world, even ifit was only 
part time. That is what has been taken from her as a result of these last two injuries. There is no 
debate that she lacks the capacity to work in any setting; part time, full time, sedentary, etc. What 
little ability that she had and what she persevered with is no longer viable. 
3. The Commission Improperly Applied Hamilton - Bybee. 
Two cases have come out of the Supreme Comi in the last several years concerning fact 
patterns where a previously disabled workerre-enters the workforce and is then injured, only to find 
that they can no longer work again. These two cases both focus on the subtleties of the language 
appearing in Idaho Code §72-332. Reference is made to the portion of the statute that indicates that 
the disability must be from the "combined effects" of the pre-existing impainnent and the 
subsequent injury. Hamilton vs. Ted Beamis Logging & Const., 127 Idaho 221, 899 P.2d. 434 (I 995); 
Bybee vs. State, Indus. Special Indem., 129 Idaho 76,921 P.2d. 1200 (1996). 
It appears as though the underlying analysis in Hamilton and Bybee are that sympathetic 
employers do exist. Indeed, Mr. Hamilton went back to work for his previous employer after a 
lengthy recuperation following a relatively severe injury that had predated the one that brought him 
before the Comi. As the Comi framed the issue, it was obliged to: 
Consider whether a Claimant, who was totally and pennanently disabled at the time 
ofan industrial accident and employed only because of the sympathy ofhis employer, 
is entitled to an award of total disability benefits. 
127 Idaho 221 @ 223. 
It is clear that the Supreme Court in reversing the Industrial Commission was moved by the 
fact that the Claimant had only been offered a job by the employer "because they were friends and 
Beamis was attempting to help Hamilton out." 127 Idaho 221 @ 224. This is, indeed, the classic 
sympathetic employer. 
Bybee vs. State, Indus. Special lndem., supra, involved slightly different but analogous facts 
to Hamilton. In Bybee, the Commission had determined that the injured worker, even though she 
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was employed at the time of the "second injury," was involved in employment that was "essentially 
the equivalent of that of a sympathetic employer or friend." 129 Idaho 76 at 83. 
Bybee sets forth the analytical framework for tribunals to follow in analyzing the factors set 
forth in Idaho Code §72-332, with particular emphasis on the "combined with" element. In order 
for a Claimant to establish odd lot status, per Bybee, he must first demonstrate that he was employed 
at the time of his second injmy. Thereafter, the pa1iy seeking to invoke Hamilton must then show 
that the Claimant's actual employment was due to "a business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effo1i on her part." 129 Idaho Code 76 
at 129, quoting from Lyons vs. Indus. Special Indem, 98 Idaho 403 at 406. Thus, it appears that this 
Court, in analyzing fact patterns where a paiiially disabled worker suffers a subsequent injury and 
contends that the combined effects render him totally disabled, will not condone the award of total 
and permanent disability benefits if the employment during the second injury was due to the factors 
listed above. Id. 
Here, there is no evidence in this record that the employment Claimant held with S.L. Start 
was due to a business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular employer, temporary good lnck, or a 
superhuman effo1i on her part. Moreover, the fact that she had held five previous jobs where she was 
allowed to use a combination of her post secondary education and perseverance to be employed 
separates this case rather dramatically from the fact patterns in Hamilton or Bybee. Her lengthy 
employment record with a variety of employers and letters of recommendation take Betty 
Christensen's case out of the Hamilton - Bybee context. 
It appears as though the hearing officer improperly analyzed the combined with requirement 
of Idaho Code §72-332 and based the decision entirely on the fact that the Claimant was only 
involved in part-time work and that she was receiving Social Security. 
The logic of the hearing officer is somewhat seductive. After all, why should a person on 
Social Security seek total and permanent disability benefits? Hasn't that person, in fact, told the 
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world that she is unable to work and, hence, is receiving the safety net provided by the Social 
Security Administration? The answer is yes and no. 
As previously mentioned, the Social Security system in this country recognizes that certain 
workers should have the right to earn a modest amount of money on a monthly basis and not be 
deemed disqualified from Social Security benefits. As mentioned, infra, $700 a month at times 
material was the threshold amount that the Social Security Administration deems as "substantial 
gainful activity" within the meaning of the federal statutory scheme and the regulations interpreting 
the same. 
Against the implicit suggestion that Betty Christensen would be "double dipping" by 
receiving Social Security and total and pennanent disability benefits consider the fact that the 
amount of benefits she shall receive would be greatly capitated in her case owing to her previous 
average monthly earnings. This ceiling is part and parcel of the entire fabric of the Worker's 
Compensation Act in this state. 
As the Undersigned attempted to point out to the tribunal below, the fact that Betty was on 
Social Security and that she would attain a markedly reduced amount of disability benefits were she 
to prevail below is already punislnnent enough, if you will, for the fact that she wasn't "fully" 
employed. 
The Worker's Compensation Act has within it numerous seemingly arbitrary caps on 
benefits. First of all, unless a person is totally and pennanently disabled, a person that is severely 
injured will only receive compensation for a percentage of 500 weeks. Thus, the 20 year old person 
with a below knee amputation receives the same amount as the 65 year old worker with the same 
injury, even though the 20 year old person has a longer time to endure his disability. Idaho Code 
§72-426, 428. 
Additionally, there is a cap on the monetary amount a person can receive as a percentage of 
his previous earnings. Thus, even if a person was earning over $100,000, such as a Supreme Court 
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Justice, that person, when receiving worker's compensation, would only get a portion of the average 
state wage, which is somewhere in the neighborhood of $32,000. Idaho Code §72-409. 
Thus, there are seemingly arbitrary limits of the amount of and dnration of impairment and 
disability payments that can be received by an injured workers. Betty Christensen's life plays into 
this drama in the sense that she would only receive a bare minimum of worker's compensation 
benefits were she to have prevailed below. 
Indeed, Betty Christensen will receive no more than 45% of the average weekly wage and 
it is possible that she could be receiving somewhere between 15% of the state wage and 45%. As 
of October of 2005, the average weekly state wage in Idaho was $543. 
4. Hamilton and Bybee Should be Overruled. 
The Hamilton/Bybee Doctrine, as is has become known by practitioners of worker's 
compensation, is a modem anachronism. It stands for the proposition that the safety net granted to 
employers in the form ofidaho Code §72-332 and, coincidentally, to employees, is really not there. 
Anyone who attempts to pull himself up by the bootstraps, tum off Oprah and get a job, is subject 
to being found to be a total by an ex post facto ruling of a referee. 
There must be some line that can be drawn between the superhuman effort of an employer 
that re-enters the workplace following a partially disabling injury and the bittersweet finding by a 
tribunal, several years after the fact, that that person was deemed to be a "walking total." The 
Undersigned would propose a modification of the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine. This modification 
would bar the employer who has knowingly employed a partially disabled worker from asserting odd 
lot status in the event of a subsequent injury. After all, that employer benefitted from the labor of 
the partially disabled employee, as do all other employers in this State. Moreover, the Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund should likewise be barred from asserting the doctrine. 
Such a rule would not be a dramatic departure from the statutory scheme as it exists. The 
entire statute is written as to the employee who is seeking benefits. Nothing in the statute 
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specifically creates the so-called Hamilton - Bybee defense, save and except the combined with 
language in the statute. Idaho Code §72-332. 
On such a nan-ow wisp was this judge made defense created. As the dissent in Bybee pointed 
out, the Commission based its finding of the sympathetic employer on the basis of expert testimony, 
to wit "that only with a sympathetic employer would she be employed." 129 Idaho 76 at 84. 
Although Justice Silak's dissent turned on substantial competent evidence, the debate 
inherent in Bybee leads one to conclude that Hamilton staiied this Court on a slippery slope in 
attempting to over analyze and perhaps give some extra statutory judicial immunity to the Second 
Injury Fund. What one finds most galling with this thinly veiled immunity is that there is no sound 
policy reason for the saine. The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is created by and maintained by 
a tax on worker's compensation settlements. Idaho Code §72-327. This Fund is for the benefit of 
those employers that would be otherwise reluctant to hire partially disabled employees and ce1iainly 
for the benefit of those employees who seek work with a disability. 
This Court has done a disservice to the working men and women of this State who have 
attempted to re-enter the workforce following severe injuries. It is time to put ai1 end to this injustice 
with a bright line ruling that creates estoppel principles with respect to which party can assert the 
combined with element. Having written the foregoing, the Undersigned is soberly aware that the 
purported judicial activism of Justice Trout in the Hamilton and Bybee decisions may well be 
i11terpreted by this Court as simply thoughtful analysis of the statute. 
The response would be that the hallmark of the Worker's Compensation Act is so that the 
statute can provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen ai1d their families." Idaho Code 
§72-332. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Commission erred in the first instai1ce by 
not following the recently announced two-tiered ai1alysis of disability and, more profoundly, by 
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improperly fitting this case into the Hamilton - Bybee rubric. This Court is further invited to discard 
into the trash can of history the holdings of Hamilton and Bybee. 
Respectfully submitted this..:]_ day of ~ ~ , 2008. 
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